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ASSAULT ON THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: PRIVATE




AMERICAN ECONOMIC theory has as two of its basic
premises the following, sometimes conflicting, pro-
positions: one, that there should be a free market econ-
omy, and two, that a monopoly or concentration of
market power in an industry should be avoided. Nowhere
is this conflict more evident than in the airline industry.
As demonstrated by the movement towards deregula-
tion,' consumers and policy makers once believed that the
airline industry, if left alone, would provide free competi-
tion and competitive pricing.2 Now, some fifteen years af-
ter the Airline Deregulation Act,3  even the casual
observer would contest that conclusion. After an initial
period of heavy entry into the market, the number of air-
lines has significantly decreased due primarily to merger
I Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Airline Deregulation
Act].
2 Opponents of airline deregulation argued that the industry would have
enough competitors to ensure a healthy market. Further, the proponents of de-
regulation based their argument on contestability. These proponents, most nota-
bly former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Alfred Kahn, did not deny
that air transportation had significant economies of scale, scope, or density. In-
stead, the contestability theory rested on the notion that the natural monopolist
would be forced to price at cost by the threat of potential entry. PAUL S. DEMPSEY,
FLYING BLIND: THE FAILURE OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 7 (1990).
3 Airline Deregulation Act, supra note 1.
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or bankruptcy. 4
Preserving a free market and preventing unfair compe-
tition requires enforcement measures. Instead of regulat-
ing entry into the market, policing the airline industry has
now fallen to the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice5 and lawsuits brought by private individuals under
various antitrust laws.6 This comment will focus on one
of those enforcement mechanisms, the private action, and
will investigate whether it is an effective enforcement
mechanism. Most of the factual context of this article re-
volves around the recent settlement of In re Domestic Air
Transportation Antitrust Litigation.7 The case was brought by
a class of plaintiffs who charged nine major airlines with
price fixing.8 The alleged scheme was accomplished
through codes transmitted via a computer system.9 Any-
one who travelled on a commercial airline between 1988
and 1992 was a member of the class.' 0 This comment will
discuss whether such litigation is an appropriate use of
4 Since deregulation, more than 200 airlines have gone bankrupt or been ac-
quired in mergers, and only 74 carriers remain. DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 11.
Among the casualties were Air Florida, Skytrain, and People Express. Further-
more, Eastern Airlines, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., and Midway Airlines, Inc. have all gone into bankruptcy. Since 1979,
more than twenty carriers have left the industry. House Passes Bill to Increase Compe-
tition in Airline Industry, 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 225 (Aug. 20,
1992).
The Airline Deregulation Act, supra note 1, terminated the Civil Aeronautics
Board's regulatory jurisdiction over the airlines on January 1, 1985. Air Carrier
Economic Regulation, 2 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 9005 (1989). The Department of Trans-
portation took over antitrust authority in 1985; however, the Department's trans-
ferred authority, involving cooperative working arrangements, antitrust
exemptions, and mergers and interlocking relationships between carriers, termi-
nated on January 1, 1989. Id. Jurisdiction over those issues passed to the domain
of the Department ofJustice and the Federal Trade Commission, thus subjecting
the air carrier industry to standard antitrust precepts. Id.
6 See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15,
26 (1988).
No. I:90-CV-2485-MHS & MDL No. 867 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 3, 1991).
In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., Second Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint 35.
9 Id. 26(c).
1o Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlements with Certain De-
fendants, and Hearing, § II.
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public and private resources and the available alternatives
to private litigation.
II. THE ANTITRUST LAWS: AN OVERVIEW
A. THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes monopolies that
unreasonably restrain trade illegal." Although there has
been substantial Sherman Act litigation, reported airline
industry litigation under the Act is limited. In Illinois Cor-
porate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. 12 an agreement
whereby an airline had its own reservation and ticketing
service that not only sold air travel but also made hotel
and rental car reservations in competition with its agents,
was held not to be illegal per se under the antitrust laws.
Instead, the court held that illegality depended on
whether the agreement reduced supply from the consum-
ers' perspective. The court argued that only an agree-
ment among air carriers could accomplish that; therefore,
the service did not violate the law.' 3 Conversely, in Inter-
national Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc. "4 an air-
line's campaign to prevent travel group charters from
becoming a competitive threat to its regularly scheduled
air service was held to be a violation of section 1 of the
Section 1 of the Sherman Act specifically provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every per-
son who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not ex-
ceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Notwithstanding the broad language employed in the stat-
ute, courts have interpreted the statute to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of
trade. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982)
(indicating that even early Supreme Court cases rejected a literal reading of the
term "every"); see also THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 1.02[l] (1993).
12 889 F.2d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990).
1s Id.
14 623 F.2d 1255, 1268 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980).
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Sherman Act. The airline used false, misleading, and de-
ceptive advertising directed at consumers and travel
agents.
B. THE CLAYTON ACT
Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914 in order to
supplement the provisions of the Sherman Act.' 5 While
section 2 embodies what is commonly known as the
Robinson-Patman Act,16 section 3 prohibits tying arrange-
ments, 7 section 7 prohibits certain types of mergers, I8
and section 8 prohibits certain types of corporate inter-
locks.' 9 Section 4 of the Clayton Act 20 provides for a pri-
vate cause of action in federal court.2 ' In addition,
Is VAKERICS, supra note 11, § 1.02[2].
16 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). The Robinson-Patman Act addresses the problem of
price discrimination. See VAKERICS, supra note 11, § 1.02[3].
17 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
is Id. § 18.
19 Id. § 19.
20 Id. § 15.
21 Section 4(a) sets forth the amount of damages as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may
award under this section, pursuant to a motion by such person
promptly made, simple interest on actual damages for the period
beginning on the date of service of such person's pleading setting
forth a claim under the antitrust laws and ending on the date of
judgment, or for any shorter period therein, if the court finds that
the award of such interest for such period is just in the circum-
stances. In determining whether an award of interest under this sec-
tion for any period is just in the circumstances, the court shall
consider only -
(1) whether such person or the opposing party, or either party's
representative, made motions or asserted claims or defenses so lack-
ing in merit as to show that such party or representative acted inten-
tionally for delay, or otherwise acted in bad faith;
(2) whether, in the course of the action involved, such person or
the opposing party, or either party's representative, violated any ap-
plicable rule, statute, or court order providing for sanctions for dila-
tory behavior or otherwise providing for expeditious proceedings;
and
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section 16 of the Clayton Act provides for injunctive
relief 22
C. THE MARKET FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION AND
ANTITRUST THEORIES
Prior to the comprehensive governmental regulation
that deregulation sought to eliminate, the air transporta-
tion industry operated on a laissez faire economic basis.23
Regulation was sought because of "destructive competi-
tion,"2 4 which drove down prices and caused bankruptcies
and mergers. The result was the emergence of monopo-
lies or oligopolies.2 5 Regulation was seen as a way to
avoid the "potential threats to safety, service and invest-
ment . .. . on the one hand, and the price-gouging and
price discrimination associated with market power in a
consolidated industry, on the other. ' 26  Congress re-
(3) whether such person or the opposing party, or either party's
representative, engaged in conduct primarily for the purpose of de-
laying the litigation or increasing the cost thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
22 Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue
for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage
by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and
19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles
as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or
damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing
such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against
damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing
that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a prelim-
inary injunction may issue: Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or associ-
ation except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive
relief against any common carrier subject to the provisions of subti-
tle IV of title 49, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation,
supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. In any action under this section in which the plaintiff sub-
stantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, to such plaintiff.
Id. § 26.
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sponded with the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the
following forty years of regulation.
During the 1960s and 1970s economists began to extol
the virtues of optimal allocation of market resources
through an economy free of government regulation.
Regulation was seen as inflating airline costs and deflating
airline profits.2 8  Alfred Kahn, former Chairman of the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), argued persuasively
against regulation of the airline industry. Kahn concluded
that CAB regulation:
(a) caused air fares to be considerably higher than they
otherwise would be; (b) resulted in a serious misallocation
of resources; (c) encouraged carrier inefficiency; (d) de-
nied consumers the range of price/service options they
would prefer, and; (e) created a chronic tendency toward
excess capacity in the industry.2 9
The movement towards deregulation3 0 resulted in the
27 Id. at 5; see Robert M. Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984):
Turning the Tide, 14 TRANSP. LJ. 101, 106 n.17 (1985); see also WILLIAM A. JORDAN,
AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS (1970); RICHARD
E. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUSTRY STUDY (1967);
LUCILE SHEPPARD KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION
(1951).
28 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 5.
29 Id. See generally Alfred E. Kahn, The Theory and Application of Regulation, 55
ANTITRUST L.J. 177, 178 (1986); Alfred E. Kahn, Transportation Deregulation... and
All That, ECON. DEV. Q. 91, 92 (1987).
30 "Destructive competition" was not seen as a threat to the deregulated air
transportation industry (despite pre-regulation conditions):
A justification sometimes offered for regulation is that in the ab-
sence of regulation competition would be "destructive." In other
words, without regulation, an industry might operate at a loss for
long periods .... When there is excess capacity in a competitive
industry .. .prices can fall far below average cost. This is because
individual producers minimize their losses by continuing to produce
so long as their variable (avoidable) costs are covered, since they
would incur their fixed (overhead) costs whether they produced or
not.
What is "destructive" about large and long-lasting losses? Some
economists have suggested that they would result in long periods of
inadequate investment and slow technical progress which in turn
might lead to poor service and periodic shortages ....
Another scenario that has sometimes been suggested is that peri-
ods of large losses will result in wholesale bankruptcies and the
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Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.31 In 1985, the Depart-
ment of Transportation received the CAB's remaining re-
sponsibilities, including oversight of mergers.3 2
Proponents of deregulation thought the airlines would
benefit because the industry lacked significant economies
of scale. 3 3 Proponents argued that, absent significant ad-
vantages from being a large firm rather than a small firm,
there would be no motive to merge. 4 Thus, there would
be enough competitors to "satisfy the traditional notion
of workable competition."3 5
Even those who argued that economies of scale existed
were confronted with the theory that the air transporta-
tion market was contestable - that is, the threat of entry
shakeout of many small producers with the result that the industry in
question becomes highly concentrated in a few large firms ... A
third and related notion is the possibility that powerful firms might
engage in predation ....
"Destructive competition" seems ... unlikely in the cases of air-
lines and trucks.
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFF., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1978).
31 Airline Deregulation Act, supra note 1.
32 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 6.
3S Alfred Kahn, in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Aviation
said "I do not honestly believe that the big airlines are going to be able to wipe
out the smaller airlines, if only because every study we have ever made seems to
show that there are not economies of scale." Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1137 (1977). Dempsey explains the concept of economies of
scale as follows:
Economies of scale are realized when increases in total production
simultaneously decrease unit costs. As the scale of production
grows, the enterprise becomes more efficient. The classic example
of the phenomenon of economies of scale is the enormous cost sav-
ings experienced from producing automobiles on an assembly line
rather than one car at a time. The cost savings resulting from econ-
omies of scale can be attributed to: (1) indivisibilities - a large capi-
tal-intensive piece of equipment operates most efficiently at full
capacity; and (2) division and specialization of labor - highly spe-
cialized labor is more productive labor.
DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 69 n.14. See generally, ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, EcONOM-
ICS EXPLAINED (1982); WILLIAM G. SHEPARD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION (1979); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).
34 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 7.
35 Id.
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would keep market participants' prices low. 36 Because the
market was contestable, destructive competition would
not result from deregulation. 3 7 Those who argued con-
testability did not deny that the air transportation industry
had significant economies of scale, but rather that the nat-
ural monopolist would be forced to price at cost because
of the threat of potential entry.38 In order for contestabil-
ity to be viable in a particular market, the following three
conditions must be satisfied: (1) the potential entrant
must have access to the same technology as the incum-
bent; (2) entry into and exit from a particular market must
be without cost; and (3) consumers must respond to a
price reduction on the entrant's part more quickly than
the incumbents can respond with a matching price cut. 39
Finally, Alfred Kahn argued that price wars were not likely
to result:
First the assumption that you are going to get really in-
tense, severe, cut throat competition just seems to me un-
realistic when you are talking about a relatively small
number of carriers who meet one another in one market
after another. We don't find in American industry gener-
ally when you have a few relatively large carriers compet-
ing with one another that they engage in bitter and
extended price wars.4"
Experience in post-deregulation air transportation in-
dustry does not, unfortunately, bear out the optimistic
predictions of Alfred Kahn and others. First, there has
been national concentration of airlines. Between 1979
16 Id. at 7-10. Melvin Brenner has noted that failure of these researchers to find
economies of scale may be because they were analyzing the industry as it existed
in its regulated environment. Hub and spoking to capture economies of scale was
a post-deregulation phenomenon as was the use of frequent flier programs to cap-
ture customer loyalty. Melvin A. Brenner, Airline Deregulation - A Case Study in
Public Policy Failure, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 179, 186-88 (1988).
31 See generally, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THE-
ORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
38 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 7.
39 Id. at 8.
40 Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm.
on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178-79 (1978).
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and 1988, there were fifty-one airline mergers and acqui-
sitions.4 1 While the Department of Transportation, after
December 31, 1984, was charged with insuring against
"unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive prac-
tices ' 42 and avoiding "unreasonable industry concentra-
tion, excessive market domination ' 43 that would enable
the carriers to "unreasonably ... increase prices, reduce
services or exclude competition, ' 44 it approved every
merger submitted to it.45 Because of these mergers, the
airlines are carrying a staggering amount of long-term
debt.46
Furthermore, competition with airlines under the pro-
tection of bankruptcy has forced healthy airlines to price
below cost just to be competitive.4 7 In 1992, the airlines
endured a third straight year of heavy losses. 4 Although
now showing modest profits, American Airlines' net 1992
loss alone was $935 million,49 and the airline began to
consider restricting the regions in which it operates.
A second significant result of deregulation has been the
emergence of the hub and spoke system. A hub is an air-
port dominated by a single airline. Airlines have con-
structed a "hub and spoke" system by "funneling their
arrivals and departures into and out of hub airports where
they dominate the arrivals, departures, and infrastruc-
ture."' 50 The hub and spoke system hurts the consumer
41 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 12.
42 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (1988).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 13. The Department of Transportation required
that some shuttle routes be sold off in the northeastern corridor, but otherwise
the Eastern acquisition by Texas Air was approved. Id. at 72 n.44.
46 Byron Acohido, Official Says Airlines' Growth Outpaced Demand, SEATrLE TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1993, at C8.
47 Id.; see also James Ott, U.S. Airlines Await Clinton Directions, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Jan. 25, 1993, at 34 (one proposal to alleviate the crisis in the airline indus-
try has been to revise the bankruptcy laws to restrict the period for airline reor-
ganization and to reduce distortions to the level of competition).
48 Ott, supra note 47, at 34.
49 Id.
- DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 16.
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because the airlines have left the competitive smaller mar-
kets in favor of servicing the larger hub markets.5' Addi-
tionally, fares have increased for those passengers
traveling to and from hub cities because of concentra-
tion. 2 Also, routes are longer because many airlines
travel out of the way merely to accommodate the hub.53
Finally, the contestability theory has proven not to pre-
vent monopolistic behavior of market participants.54 The
premise of contestability was the threat of entry; the cur-
rent environment demonstrates that such threat is un-
likely. First, in most major airports, there are no available
landing slots. 55 Even if an incumbent were willing to lease
a landing slot, that incumbent could extract monopoly
rents.56 A second contributor to the debunking of the
contestability theory is the ownership of computer reser-
vation systems (CRSs).57 United Airlines and American
Airlines own CRSs from which almost ninety percent of
the tickets are sold.58 In order to gain access to the valua-
ble reservation systems, many smaller airlines have affili-
ated with the major carriers. 59 A third reason that entry
into the air transportation market is subject to significant
barriers is the frequent-flyer programs instituted by the
51 Id.
52 Id. at 18; see also William Stockton, When Eight Carriers Call the Shots, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1988, at 3-1; Thomas Hamburger, Fares Rose With NWA's Domi-
nance, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 1988, at IA. See generally, GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, AIR FARES AND SERVICE AT CONCENTRATED AIRPORTS (1989); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION (1988).
53 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 30-31.
Id. at 21-25.
-- Hardaway, supra note 27, at 107.
56 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 21. For example, in Detroit, Northwest subleases a
landing slot to Southwest Airlines for 18 times the amount what Northwest itself
pays. Id.
51 See generally, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: IMPACT OF
COMPUTERIZED RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS (1986). Indeed, the focus of congressional
action has been on the CRSs. See infra part V.B. 1. For an interesting article chal-
lenging the notion that CRSs reduce competition, see Andrew N. Kleit, Computer
Reservations Systems: Competition Misunderstood, 1992 ANTITRUST BULL. 833, 860-61.
58 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 22.
59 Id. Small carriers affiliating themselves with the megacarriers include those
which have been renamed as United Express, Continental Express and American
Eagle. Id.
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megacarriers that create consumer loyalty.60 As noted by
one commentator:
Once committed to a carrier's frequent flyer program and
having some investment in accumulated mileage, business
travelers often prefer that carrier over its rivals even when
the rivals' flights are cheaper, especially since most busi-
ness travel is not paid for by the individual flying, but by
his or her firm.6'
Other barriers to entry exist that make contestability un-
likely. These barriers include high costs of labor for new
entrants62 and price matching by the incumbents. 61
60 Id.
6 Id. Not only do frequent flyer programs create passenger loyalty, but be-
cause of bonuses paid to agents who generate a target revenue level, loyalty is also
created among travel agents. Id.
62 According to Dempsey:
[A]lthough new entrants enjoyed significantly lower labor costs in
the inaugural years of deregulation, the squeeze on carrier profits
unleashed by deregulation has forced management to exact serious
concessions in terms of labor wages and work rules. Some, like Con-
tinental, Eastern, and TWA, have effectively crushed their unions.
Others, like United, American, and Delta, established two-tier pay
scales, with B grade pay for newly hired employees. Thus, the mar-
gin of labor cost and productivity between a new entrant and an es-
tablished airline has been significantly narrowed.
DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 23.
63 Dempsey offers the following illustration:
For example, suppose our new carrier, Air Omaha, does some calcu-
lations and finds that if it offers a $49 fare between Omaha and Min-
neapolis, it will fill about 70 percent of its seats, because the
incumbent, Northwest, offers no fare so low. Because of lower labor
costs and the use of leased, relatively old equipment, let us assume
Air Omaha's break-even load factor is a modest 55 percent. So, Air
Omaha begins operations and rolls in a healthy profit, right?
Wrong. Northwest matches the $49 fare, and Air Omaha's load
factors drop to, say 35 percent, well below its break even load factor.
Not only can Northwest withstand the loss because of its deeper
pocket, but the discount fare actually costs it little, because it is only
offered to passengers traveling between the two points (origin and
destination traffic). Remember, Northwest has a major hub in Min-
neapolis, and most of its passengers are traveling from or to points
beyond - in industry jargon, they constitute "beyond-segment
feed"; they are not offered the bargain fare. Thus, only a portion of
Northwest's passengers are enjoying the discount. Moreover, many
of the business travelers in the city-pair market will be willing to pay
more than $49 because they are addicted to Northwest's frequent
flyer program. Air Omaha must eventually exit the market, for ordi-
994 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
III. IN RE DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORTATION
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
A. FACTS
In 1990 a class action lawsuit, In re Domestic Air Transpor-
tation Antitrust Litigation,6 was instituted against the Air-
line Tariff Publishing Company, Inc. (ATPC), American
Airlines, Inc. (American), Continental Airlines, Inc. (Con-
tinental), Delta Airlines, Inc. (Delta), Midway Airlines,
Inc. (Midway), Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Northwest), Pan
narily only a carrier with a hub at the other end point can success-
fully challenge a rival at its hub.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64 The class action originated from about 40 separate suits in federal courts
around the country. In November, 1990, the federal Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation consolidated the suits into In re Domestic Air Transportation Anti-
trust Litigation and transferred it to Atlanta. The following are decisions
resulting from the litigation: In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148
F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (approving settlement and award of attorneys fees); In
re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. I:90-CV-2485-MHS, 1992 WL
357,433 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 1992) (granting injunction precluding Advanced
Telecom Services and Spot Communications from advertising or using "1-900"
calls to provide information and claim forms to class members); In re Domestic Air
Transp. Antitrust Litig., 144 F.R.D. 421, 424 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (denying objectors'
motion to intervene on the basis that representation was adequate and that
"[c]lass members who object to a settlement do not have an absolute right to
conduct discovery and presentation of evidence"); In re Domestic Air Transp. An-
titrust Litig., 142 F.R.D. 354 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding plaintiffs entitled to tran-
scripts of civil investigative demand depositions taken by Department ofJustice of
employees and ex-employees over whom defendants had control); In re Domestic
Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. 1:90-CV-2485-MHS, 1992 WL 120,351 (N.D. Ga.
Apr. 8, 1992) (denying defendants' motion to compel plaintiffs to respond to con-
tention interrogatories); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. 1:90-CV-
2485-MHS, 1992 WL 114,423 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1992) (requiring deposition of
defendant Delta Air Lines Senior Pricing Analyst ordered to continue in "orderly
and cooperative manner"); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 141 F.R.D.
556 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (ruling that plaintiffs were entitled to discover copies of civil
investigative demands and airlines' answers, and were permitted to contact de-
fendants' former employees ex parte, and that defendants were permitted to pro-
duce only official comments as well as nonprivileged documents to Department of
Justice, Department of Transportation and United States Congress relating to
fares, computer systems, and airline hubs); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust
Litig., 141 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (approving the method and content of
notification to class members); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 137
F.R.D. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (certifying nationwide class of airline ticket passen-
gers); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. 1:90-CV-2485-MHS, 1990
WL 358,009 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 21, 1990) (approving pre-trial order for organization
and conduct of litigation).
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American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am), Trans World
Airlines, Inc. (TWA), United Airlines, Inc. (United), and
USAir, Inc. (USAir) .65 The plaintiffs66 charged that the
65 American, Continental, Delta, Midway, Northwest, Pan Am, TWA, United,
and USAir will be referred to collectively as "defendant airlines."
The suit was initiated, in part, in response to a government investigation insti-
gated in 1989 to determine whether the airlines conspired to fix prices by signal-
ing each other about fare plans through ATPC. On December 21, 1992, the
Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust suit against ATPC, Alaska Airlines,
Inc., American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, and USAir. As in In
re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation, the suit alleged "that the air-
lines are operating a computerizedfare exchange system in a manner that unreasona-
bly restrains price competition .... United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing
Co., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,092 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1992). The Govern-
ment has asked for an injunction to stop airline efforts to fix prices for the next ten
years. See Betsy Wade, Decision Seen in Airline Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at E3.
Under a proposed consent decree between the government, USAir, and
United, the following conduct would be prohibited:
(A) agreeing with any other airline to fix, establish, raise, stabilize,
or maintain any fare;
(B) disseminating any first ticket dates, last ticket dates, or any
other information concerning the defendant's planned or contem-
plated fares or changes to fares;
(C) making visible or disseminating its own tags or any other simi-
lar designating mechanism to any other airline;
(D) making visible or disseminating to any other airline any fare
that is intended solely to communicate a defendant's planned or
contemplated fares or changes to fares;
(E) making visible or disseminating two or more footnote designa-
tors that identify footnotes that contain identical information, or
making visible or disseminating any footnote designator that identi-
fies a footnote that contains no information; and
(F) using fare codes that convey information other than fare class
or terms and conditions of sale or travel.
United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co. [Proposed Final Judgment], 7 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,742, at 51,538 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1992). On March 17,
1994, the Department of Justice settled with the six remaining airlines on essen-
tially the same terms as the USAir and United settlement. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 141-143.
66 On August 7, 1991, the plaintiffs' class was certified. In re Domestic Air
Transp. Antitrust Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1991). The court certified the
class despite recognized difficulties in identifying all class members. Instead, the
court recognized that if the class could not be certified, the action most likely
would not be brought due to the de minimis nature of individual plaintiff's claims.
Id. at 694. The August 7, 1991 order was amended on July 13, 1992 defining the
class as:
All persons in the United States who, during the period January 1,
1988 to June 30, 1992, were the purchasers of domestic airline pas-
senger tickets from American Airlines, Inc., Continental Airlines,
Inc., Delta Airlines, Inc., Midway Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines,
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defendants violated the antitrust laws by engaging in an
unlawful conspiracy to fix prices for domestic air trans-
portation.6 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant air-
lines used the ATPC computer system to exchange
current and future price information, to signal price
changes, and to solicit agreement as to price changes.68
Plaintiffs also alleged that the airlines allocated certain
airline markets. 69 As a result of this activity, plaintiffs ar-
gued that prices for airline tickets for such flights were
higher than they otherwise would have been. 70 Further-
more, plaintiffs also alleged that because of this conspira-
torial activity, competition in the passenger air
transportation industry had been restrained. 7' The class
sought injunctive relief as well as monetary relief, includ-
ing treble damages, costs of suit, and reasonable attor-
neys' fees.72
B. LEGAL THEORIES
Plaintiffs brought suit under sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act.73 Section 4 governs suits by persons injured
by "reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 74
The law provides a private cause of action with jurisdic-
tion in federal court. 75 Furthermore, a successful claim-
Inc., Pan American World Airways, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
United Airlines, Inc., or USAir, Inc. for air transportation to or from
a hub (as defined herein) or on a single airline connecting at such a
hub (but excluding all governmental entities, defendants, their par-
ents, subsidiaries, and affiliates and the directors, officers and em-
ployees of defendants, their parents, subsidiaries and affiliates).
Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlements with Certain Defend-
ants, and Hearing, § II, Domestic Air Tramp. (No. I:90-CV-2485-MHW & MDL No.
861).
61 Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, 35, Domestic Air






73 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1988).
7. Id. § 15.
75 Id. § 15(a).
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ant may recover treble damages, interest, costs of suit,
and reasonable attorneys' fees. 7 6 Section 16 of the Clay-
ton Act permits the party suing for antitrust violations to
ask for and receive injunctive relief.77
Plaintiffs also alleged that ATPC and the defendant air-
lines violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.78 Section 1
provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 79
C. SETTLEMENT
In July 1992, the defendants agreed to a settlement that
was approved in March 1993. The settling defendants
were American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA,
United, USAir, and ATPC.80 Although the defendant air-
lines denied any wrongdoing, the total settlement in the
case was $458 million.8' Of that amount, $408 million
76 Id.
77 Id. § 26.
78 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
79 Id.
80 Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlements with Certain De-
fendants, and Hearing § III.
81 Id. at 1. Despite the seemingly generous settlement, the certificates are sub-
ject to significant limitations. Most notably, the maximum amount of certificates
issued that may be used as a credit against a single round trip ticket is determined
according to the following chart:
American, Continental, Delta, TWA, United & USAir Northwest
Certificate Round Trip Certificate Round Trip
Amount ($) Price ($) Amount ($) Price ($)
10 50 or over 25 100-200
25 250 or over 50 201-300
50 500 or over 75 301-400
75 •750 or over 100 401-500
100 1000 or over 125 501-750
125 1250 or over 150 751-1000
150 1500 or over 200 1000+
Id. § IV. To put this in perspective, if a ticket on American costs $600 and the
purchaser has certificates worth $600, that purchaser may only use $75 to offset
the price of the trip. Furthermore, the settlement agreement provides that
"[c]ertificates may not be used with any other certificates, bonuses, award certifi-
cates, or frequent flier awards .... " Id. In addition, class members who receive
certificates of more than $100 in face value "will receive certificates for $100 that
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was to be in the form of certificates, and $50 million in the
form of cash.82 Northwest and TWA denied any wrongdo-
ing or liability but agreed to certain covenants relating to
fares for a period of five years after the entry of a final
judgment approving the settlements.8 3 Also included in
the settlement documentation was an agreement by the
defendants to "establish and/or maintain a formal anti-
trust compliance program to be administered with, and
approved by, legal counsel. ' 84 Pursuant to the agreement
and subject to court approval, no amount of the fund
could be refunded to the airlines. 85 A Settlement Admin-
istration Committee, comprised of four persons recom-
mended by counsel for plaintiffs and four persons
recommended by the counsel for carriers, would be re-
sponsible for administration of the various settlements.86
The court would retain jurisdiction over the implementa-
tion and enforcement of the settlement agreement.8 7
Despite the seemingly generous settlement offer, a
number of objections have been made. Critics argue that
the airlines, instead of being subjected to punitive or com-
pensatory measures, will actually benefit from the settle-
ment.88 First, critics charge that the discount coupons
offered as part of the settlement are in reality a marketing
tool that would boost off-peak travel because the coupons
are valid as of the date of mailing, and to the extent practicable, the additional
certificates will be evenly split between certificates immediately effective and cer-
tificates that become effective one year after the date of distribution." Id. Certifi-
cates issued by American, Continental, Delta, TWA, United and USAir must be
redeemed within three years while certificates issued by Northwest must be re-
deemed within two. Certificates are redeemable only when used to purchase tick-
ets directly from the airlines; they will not be redeemable by travel agents. Id.
Finally, the certificates are subject to black-out period limitations around the New
Year, Thanksgiving, and Christmas holidays. Id.
82 Id. § III.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Agreement of Settlement 5(g), Domestic Air Transp. (No. I:90-CV-2485-MHS
& MDL No. 861).
88 Id. 8.
87 Id. 117.
88 David Johnston, Settlement of Airline Suit Draws Critics; Coupons May Bring Carriers
More Business, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 2, 1993, at 1 (Business).
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are subject to black-out periods.8 9 Furthermore, the cou-
pons may be used for no more than ten percent of a
ticket's purchase price, thus requiring a holder of $100
worth of coupons to purchase $1,000 worth of tickets. 90
The $408 million of coupons issued in the settlement will
translate into four billion dollars for the airlines if every
coupon is used. 9' Skeptics of the settlement are quick to
point out that Judge Shoob, the judge presiding over the
matter, has expressed doubt about the merits of the suit.
92
Thus, while the defendants would likely succeed in a mo-
tion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion, they have
more to gain from a settlement that generates revenue.93
Furthermore, some airlines believe that the cost of litigat-
ing the suit would exceed the cost of settlement. 94 In-
deed, Delta Air Lines has termed the suit "legal
extortion." 95
The settlement has also been criticized as being overly
complex.96 Three types of claim forms exist and those
who purchased over $2,500 worth of tickets over the four
year period covering June 1988 toJune 1992 must "[pre-
pare and retain] a summary compilation of each ticket for
which claim is made showing at least the date, airline, itin-
erary, and price paid."' 97 Preparing that summary will be
necessary for frequent travelers, but may also pose diffi-
89 Id. Black-out holidays include Thanksgiving, Christmas and the New Year.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. In that same article, Judge Shoob has been quoted as saying that "the
chances of plaintiffs recovering [are] not good" and that the case "would have a
hard time surviving a motion for summary judgment." Id.
93 Id. "Beverly Moore, editor of Class Action Reports, a newsletter that has
followed such cases for 20 years, said discount coupons are typically discarded by
consumers. She said that, at most, 15 percent of the coupons would be redeemed,
or about $61.2 million worth." Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. Following approval of the settlement, it was reported that while the air-
lines denied using the computerized system to raise ticket prices, they agreed to
settle in order to "avoid a lengthy, costly trial." Julie Schmit, Fliers' Rebates in
Holding Pattern, U.S.A. TODAY, June 11, 1993, at 2B.
96 The Antitrust Mess; Airline Price-Fixing Suit, TRAVEL WKLY, Nov. 5, 1992, at 20.
97 Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlements with Certain De-
fendants, and Hearing, Airlines Antitrust Long Claim Form C.
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culties. Beyond the basic difficulty of researching each
ticket purchased during the past four years, if airlines are
asked for copies of old tickets, most will not be able to
provide those beyond a year. Moreover, tickets that can
be provided will be subject to a $10 or $15 charge per
ticket copied.98
Finally, there has been extensive criticism, as well as
legal battles, over the attorneys' fees. 99 The plaintiffs'
98 Brigid McMenamin, Paper for Us, Money for Them, FORBES, Oct. 26, 1992, at
272.
9 See Andrew Blum, $24 Million Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1993, at 2; Jane
Okrasinski, Lawyers Ask $24 Million in Airline Suit; Firms Spell Out Rates to Justify Re-
quest in Price-Fixing Case, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at 21 [hereinafter Okrasinski,
Lawyers Ask $24 Million]; Jane Okrasinski, Value of Airline Settlement at Stake; Antitrust
Plaintiffs' Counsel Want $24M Fee, TEx. LAw., Dec. 14, 1992, at 4 [hereinafter
Okrasinski, Value of Airline Settlement]; McMenamin, supra note 98, at 272.
Fees asked by the lawyers break out as follows:
Firm
CO-LEAD COUNSEL





























Total Hours Lodestar* High Rate Low Rate













1,447 $346,734 $375 $135
862 $303,366 $375 $150
5,865 $420,914 $275 $170
1,080 $238,659 $250 $125
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lawyers are asking for 5.24% of the $458 million settle-
ment value, or $24 million. 00 Objectors argue that while
members of the plaintiff class are being compensated with
highly restrictive coupons, the lawyers are asking for fees
based on the total settlement value. Furthermore, the
fees will be deducted from the cash portion of the $458
million settlement. °10 In approving the settlement, Judge
Shoob held that the attorneys were to receive only 5.25%
of $305 million, "the median value in the range of values
of the settlement determined by the Court."' 10 2
As a final indication that even an attempt to avoid
lengthy litigation may not cut short this complex matter,
the settlement is being appealed to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. 0 3 Appellants claim that class members should be
paid in cash rather than in vouchers and argue that the
settlement, instead of compensating injured class mem-
bers, is actually a marketing tool. 0 4
IV. PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION IN A
DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
Private litigation is exceedingly expensive, time con-
suming, and subject to many procedural and substantive
hurdles. This statement is even more true for antitrust
litigation. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Freedman, Boyd,
Daniels, Peifer,
Hollander, Guttman & Goldberg
(Albuquerque, NM) 2,347 $364,674 $225 $100
Keller Rohrback
(Seattle) 1,843 $244,407 $205 $120
*Lodestar represents actual costs. Plaintiffs' lawyers are asking that the lodestar
be tripled to reflect the complexity and contingency of the case. Okrasinski, Law-
yers Ask $24 Million, supra note 99, at 21.
'00 Okrasinski, Lawyers Ask $24 Million, supra note 99, at 21.
, McMenamin, supra note 98, at 272.
102 In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 348 (N.D. Ga.
1993).
103 Schmit, supra note 95, at 2B.
104 Id.
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Corp. 105 after years of litigation, the Court held that sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropri-
ate. In 1974, American consumer electronic products
(CEPs) manufacturers Zenith and National Union Electric
Corporation (NUE) filed suit against twenty-one Japanese
manufacturers of CEPs. Zenith and NUE alleged that the
Japanese manufacturers illegally conspired to drive the
American firms from the American CEP market. After
several years of discovery, the Japanese manufacturers
moved for summary judgment on all claims against them.
The district court granted the defendants' motion, but the
court of appeals reversed, finding that "a reasonable
factfinder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the
American market in order to drive out American competi-
tors .. ,".o6 In a detailed examination of the appropriate
standards of summary judgment, the Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and reinstated the summary
judgment against Zenith and NUE.10 7
In examining what is necessary for a plaintiff in an anti-
trust suit to overcome a motion for summary judgment,
the Court held that respondents must show that there was
a genuine issue of material fact.' 0 8 There are two compo-
nents that make up this standard:
First, respondents must show more than a conspiracy in
violation of the antitrust laws; they must show an injury to
them resulting from the illegal conduct .... Second, the
issue of fact must be "genuine." When the moving party
has carried its burden under [Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure] 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts. 109
The Court then found that if claims made by the re-
spondents did not raise a material issue of fact, then the
105 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
16 Id. at 581.
107 Id. at 598.
o Id. at 585.
9 Id. at 586 (citations omitted).
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respondents were required to provide "more persuasive
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be
necessary." '" 0 Further, with respect to an antitrust claim,
the Court noted that while in a summary judgment mo-
tion the evidence is to be viewed in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party, under antitrust laws the range is
limited as to the possible inferences from ambiguous evi-
dence.'" ' Finally, the Court held that in a summary judg-
ment or directed verdict motion,"t 2 the respondents must
show that "the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in
light of the competing inferences of independent action
or collusive action that could not have harmed
respondents."' 13
Notably, in analyzing whether respondents had ad-
duced sufficient evidence to survive the summary judg-
ment motion, the Court considered whether the
petitioners had a motive to engage in the predatory pricing
scheme." 4 The Court held that "[l]ack of motive bears on
the range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn
from ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational
economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is con-
sistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the con-
duct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy." '" 5
The Court held that on remand the court of appeals was
free to consider whether
10 Id. at 587.
1" Id. at 588.
112 Note that the parallel to directed verdict is a departure from previous sum-
mary judgment principles. Summary judgment, by definition, is a motion made
prior to trial. Evidence available includes what has been obtained through discov-
ery - interrogatories, affidavits, depositions, and requests for documents. A di-
rected verdict motion, on the other hand, occurs after the non-moving party has
had a chance to present evidence in trial. Because the two scenarios are substan-
tively different, the parallel drawn by the court has the practical effect of increas-
ing the burden on the non-moving party to respond to the summary judgment
motion. Jane L. Dolkart, Summary Judgment in the Federal Courts After the Supreme
Court Trilogy, 18 BARRISTER 48-52 (1991).
113 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
114 Id. at 595.
"15 Id. at 596-97. Note that the Court, as a matter of law, is making the determi-
nation that lack of motive does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy.
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there is other evidence that is sufficiently unambiguous to
permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired to
price predatorily for two decades despite the absence of
any apparent motive to do so. The evidence must 'ten[d]
to exclude the possibility' that petitioners underpriced re-
spondents to compete for business rather than to imple-
ment an economically senseless conspiracy. 16
Matsushita was further clarified in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc. " 17 There the Court held that
there was no "special burden on plaintiffs facing summary
judgment in antitrust cases.""t 8 Instead, the reasonable
inference standard was applicable in all summary judg-
ment motions. In Kodak the allegations stated that Kodak
had unlawfully tied the sale of service for its copying and
micrographic equipment to the sale of parts in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs also alleged that
Kodak unlawfully monopolized the sale of service and
parts for such equipment in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The Court held that Kodak was required to
show that "despite evidence of increased prices and ex-
cluded competition, an inference of market power [was]
unreasonable."' '19 Accordingly, the Court held that Ko-
dak was not entitled to summary judgment.
In order for a plaintiff to survive a defendant's motion
for summary judgment in antitrust litigation, the plaintiff,
as the non-moving party, must provide evidence sufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact. °2 0 Further, the
non-moving party must provide sufficient evidence such
that when the court weighs it, as provided by Matsushita,
the court will find a genuine issue of material fact.' 2'
Making the plaintiff's burden even more difficult in airline
116 Id. at 597-98.
117 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
118 Id. at 2083.
119 Id.
120 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-86.
121 Id. at 600 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's opinion "sug-
gests that a judge hearing a defendant' motion for summary judgment in an anti-
trust case should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide
for himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff.").
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cases will be industry executives' argument that while ac-
cusations of antitrust activity may be leveled against the
industry, the airlines' overall dismal performances tend to
call into doubt whether antitrust activity existed.' 22
Also important to consider is whether any plaintiff will
be willing to make the financial investment necessary to
pursue the litigation.' 23 Matsushita made it clear that the
non-moving party must provide evidence in response to a
summary judgment motion. 2 4 Although the requirement
may have been softened somewhat by Kodak, it still may
be difficult to assemble this evidence in time to respond to
a motion for summary judgment made shortly after the
pleadings have been filed. Also, with limited discovery
available,' 25 the plaintiff may not be able to assemble suffi-
cient evidence to ward off the summary judgment motion.
B. EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT ON ANTITRUST ACTIVITIES
Settlement, while reducing the costs of pursuing litiga-
tion and providing timely compensation to injured par-
ties, has its disadvantages. First, there is no court-
ordered injunctive relief; the only equivalent is a negoti-
ated forbearance. While the settlement in In re Domestic Air
Transportation Antitrust Litigation includes provisions for im-
plementation of antitrust compliance programs, who will
insure that the compliance programs are carried out?
Further, one of the settlement's terms is that the airlines
admit no wrongdoing. In this respect, it may be difficult
122 This argument may lose some of its effectiveness if a distinction is made
between poor performance and monopolistic activities. For instance, the airlines
may be acting in a monopolistic fashion (e.g. price fixing, etc.) and may also be
expanding their markets beyond consumer demand. See Byron Acohido, Official
Says Airlines'Growth Outpaced Demand, SEA-rrLE TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at C8 (Patrick
Murphy, Acting Assistant Transportation Secretary, said that "the nation's air-
lines - apparently with good intentions - contributed to their own financial
problems by expanding too much").
123 See generally, John B. McArthur & Thomas W. Paterson, The Effects of Mon-
santo, Matsushita, and Sharp on the Plaintiffs Incentive to Sue, 23 CONN. L. REV. 333
(1991); Melinda Harmon & Gerri M. Fore, Summary Judgment in Complex Antitrust
Cases, 31 S. TEx. L. REV. 381 (1990).
124 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597.
125 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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to implement an antitrust compliance program that effects
any sort of change if airline management believe they did
nothing wrong.
Owen M. Fiss, in his article Against Settlement,126 argued
that settlement was inappropriate in four types of cases:
[T]hose cases in which there are significant distributional
inequalities; those in which it is difficult to generate au-
thoritative consent because organizations or social groups
are parties or because the power to settle is vested in au-
tonomous agents; those in which the court must continue
to supervise the parties after judgment; and those in which
justice needs to be done, or to put it more modestly,
where there is a genuine social need for an authoritative
interpretation of law.' 27
Notably, In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litiga-
tion fits neatly within the third category - those cases
which the court must continue to supervise. The fact that
the airlines may have engaged in antitrust activities im-
plies the need for injunctive relief, and compliance with
an injunction is necessary to achieve the goal of the
litigation.
Arguably, there is merit to encouraging settlement in
complex litigation. Obviously, the costs of litigation de-
crease whenever trial is avoided. Others have also argued
that settlement is preferable to full litigation on the merits
because settlement "rests on the consent of both parties
and avoids the cost of a lengthy trial."' 28 There are dan-
gers in the settlement procedure, however. For example,
consent to a settlement agreement is often coerced by a
party with superior bargaining power. In addition, the ab-
sence of trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial
involvement troublesome. Finally, settlement agreements
may not be vigoriously enforced because the courts gen-
erally decline to use their contempt power to do so.129
126 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
127 Id. at 1087.
128 Id. at 1075.
29 Id. at 1084.
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Fiss argues that "[c]ourts do not see a mere bargain be-
tween the parties as a sufficient foundation for the exer-
cise of their coercive powers.' °3 0  Thus, while an
injunction may provide a court with what it sees as an ade-
quate basis from which to act, a settlement which provides
for antitrust compliance programs may not. Violation of
an injunction may produce significantly different results
than violation of a settlement agreement.
Settlement also threatens the value of a judicial resolu-
tion. Professor Michelman identified four litigation
values:
Dignity values reflect concern for the humiliation or loss of
self-respect which a person might suffer if denied an op-
portunity to litigate. Participation values reflect an apprecia-
tion of litigation as one of the modes in which persons
exert influence, or have their wills "counted," in societal
decisions they care about. Deterrence values recognize the
instrumentality of litigation as a mechanism for influenc-
ing or constraining individual behavior in ways thought
socially desirable. Effectuation values see litigation as an im-
portant means through which persons are enabled to get,
or are given assurance of having, whatever we are pleased
to regard as rightfully theirs.' 3 '
In addition to the above values which focus on protection
of individual rights, there is an institutional demand for
the development of a body of precedent. Excessive settle-
ment of antitrust litigation may threaten the ability of
courts and companies to discover how a law applies to
limit or encourage specific actions.
C. OTHER DETRIMENTS OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST
LITIGATION
In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation demon-
strates how the use of private litigation can be inefficient,
duplicative, and costly. The settlement in this case did
so Id.
,s, Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights - Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-73 (citations omitted).
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not require the defendants to admit liability; therefore,
there is little hope that they will not repeat the same con-
duct. In addition, efforts of private litigants are often du-
plicated by the government.' 3 2  Moreover, settlement
incurs costs that seem to benefit the lawyers and even the
defendants more than the injured plaintiffs.' 3 3
Further, as evidenced by Matsushita, antitrust litigation
can be extremely time-consuming. 3 4 The Matsushita law-
suit was commenced in 1974 and it was not until 1986
that the Supreme Court decided that summary judgment
was proper unless additional unambiguous evidence
could be provided.' 3 5 Given this time frame, it is not sur-
prising that the rational course of action would be early
settlement.' 3 6
In In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation,
although only a few years have passed, Pan Am and Mid-
way are defunct, and Continental is struggling to emerge
from bankruptcy. Aside from the near impossibility of ob-
taining compensation from these companies, the effect of
any injunctive relief on the remaining market participants
will be negligible if the competitive environment has con-
tracted too much.' 3 7
132 See United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
45,092, at 44,618 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1992). This case alleges the same violations
as alleged in In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation. Indeed, the class
action based its allegation on the government investigation. See also infra notes
138-154 and accompanying text.
1" McMenamin, supra note 98, at 272.
134 According to one study, multi-district litigation cases averaged 5.7 years in
duration and 968 docket entries per consolidated case. Steven C. Salop & Law-
rence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEo. L.J. 1001,
1009 (1986). The In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation case was a re-
sult of consolidation by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
135 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
136 Even with settlement, litigation can be time consuming and costly. The In re
Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation was filed in 1990 and settled in 1993.
However, an appeal of Judge Shoob's approval of the settlement has been filed
and it may be years before class members receive their vouchers. See Schmit, supra
note 95.
'37 Noted airline analyst Morten Beyer wrote an open letter to President Clin-
ton entitled "Return to Reason" in which he stated:
If prosperity is to return, it will require some control of rates and
routes to succeed. It is not enough to rely on the ex post facto pro-
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V. ALTERNATIVES TO PRIVATE LITIGATION
A. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
Currently, individuals are bringing private actions
which rarely, if ever, result in complete judicial adjudica-
tion. The Department ofJustice (DOJ), by way of the An-
titrust Division, is also charged with investigating antitrust
activities in the airline industry.
On December 21, 1992, the DOJ filed suit against the
Airline Tariff Publishing Co. (ATPC), Alaska Airlines,
American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United,
and USAir.' 38 The lawsuit, of which In re Domestic Air
Transportation Antitrust Litigation was a partial result, 39
charged that the airlines were using ATPC's computer-
ized fare network to exchange information regarding
price increases, thereby conspiring to unreasonably re-
strain price competition. 4 ° The lawsuit filed by the DOJ
was the result of a three year investigation into activities
of the airlines. On March 17, 1994, the DOJ announced
that six remaining airlines' 4' had agreed to a settlement
whereby any new fares must be made available for sale
when filed into the ATPC system, and the only time an
airline can indicate the beginning and end of a fare sale is
when the promotion has been widely advertised in news-
papers or other media. ' 42 Notably absent from the settle-
visions of the anti-trust laws - new airlines will be long dead before
lawyers, courts and government authorities get through with their
end of the process.
Industry Consultant Asks Clinton to Establish Reasonable Controls, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS,
Feb. 1, 1993, at 1.
118 United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
45,092, at 44,618 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1992).
139 Christopher McGinnis, Business Traveler, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Dec. 28, 1992,
at E4. United Airlines and USAir resolved the DOJ charges under a consent de-
cree initially filed in December 1992. See Remaining Airlines Resolve Charges in Divi-
sion's Case on Price Fixing, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 53 (Mar. 21, 1994). See
also supra note 64.
140 Id.
141 See supra note 139.
142 SeeJesus Sanchez, Six Airlines Settle Suit Over Fares, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994,
at Al.
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ment were monetary penalties of any kind. Moreover, the
airlines did not admit guilt and instead credited settle-
ment to the desire to avoid mounting legal costs. 43
Whether the DOJ effort in this case was sufficient to vin-
dicate antitrust policies is questionable. Certainly, the
consent decree included the important injunctive relief
component; however, without monetary penalties, the de-
terrent effect of the lawsuit may be minimal.' 44
Another way to determine whether efforts to enforce
antitrust laws through the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and the DOJ are effective is to compare those ef-
forts with efforts made in other deregulated industries.
Despite antitrust laws, under deregulation, the railroad,
airline, bus, and motor carrier industries have become
more highly concentrated than at any other time in their
history. 45 Mergers in these industries have been particu-
larly prevalent in light of the competitive environment of
economic deregulation and the anemia created by traffic
dilution. 46 Given a choice between merger and bank-
ruptcy, most companies choose the former. 47
Although almost no airline mergers have been given
antitrust immunity under section 414 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act,' 48 there has been no private antitrust action in
143 Patrick J. Maio, Major Airlines Settle Price-Fixing Lawsuit, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Mar. 18, 1994, at 1.
144 The government, in deciding not to impose monetary penalties, may have
felt that the settlement exacted in the civil suit provided sufficient deterrence.
This hypothesis is weakened somewhat if the civil suit settlement is viewed as
compensating plaintiffs for injuries rather than deterring unlawful conduct.
Moreover, any deterrent effect that the civil suit settlement may provide could be
wholly outweighed by the increase in airline travel encouraged by issuance of cer-
tificates. See supra text accompanying note 89.
15 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 47.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 48. During the final days of the Bush Administration, blanket antitrust
immunity was granted to a Commercial Cooperation and Integration Agreement
between KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and Northwest Airlines. In the matter of The
Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., 2 Aviation L. Rep.
(CCH) 22,876 (Dept. of Transp., Order No. 93-1-1 l,Jan. 11, 1993; as amended
Jan. 12, 1993). Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act gives the DOT discretion
to grant antitrust immunity for an agreement approved under section 412 to the
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opposition to the mergers. 49 Also, since the DOT as-
sumed jurisdiction over airline mergers, acquisitions, and
consolidations on December 31, 1984, it has approved
every airline merger submitted to it. 50
Another factor contributing to the relatively ineffective
use of the antitrust laws in the airline and other transpor-
tation industries is the lack of political pressure imposed
on the agencies to vigorously enforce the laws.'5 The
twelve-year Republican hold on the nation's policies re-
sulted in a hands-off approach to the regulation (or lack
thereof) of business in the United States.1 52
extent necessary to enable the parties to proceed with the transaction. Id. "Sec-
tion 412 . . . authorizes the Department [of Transportation] to approve agree-
ments relating to foreign air transportation." Id. Although the DOT has been
reluctant in the past to grant antitrust immunity because of its inconsistency with
the goals of deregulation, in this case the DOT held that the grant of immunity
"should promote competition by furthering our efforts to obtain less restrictive
aviation agreements with other European countries." Id. Furthermore, the ad-
ministrative body held that given the United States' Open Skies Accord with the
Netherlands, "a denial of antitrust immunity would contravene the spirit of the
Accord and be counterproductive to the United States' relations with the Nether-
lands." Id.
149 But see supra part IV (arguing that private antitrust action is not a realistic
option).
150 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 13. Dempsey notes the following:
[The DOT] approved Texas Air's (i.e. Continental and New York
Air) acquisition of both People Express (which included Frontier),
and Eastern Airlines (which included Braniff's Latin American
Routes); United's acquisition of Pan Am's transpacific routes; Ameri-
can's acquisition of AirCal; Delta's acquisition of Western; North-
west's acquisition of Republic (itself a product of the mergers of
North Central, Southern and Hughes Airwest); TWA's acquisition of
Ozark; and USAir's acquisition of PSA and Piedmont.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
'5, See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the
1990's, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (1991).
152 Id. With the election of a Democratic president, the public may see a change
in philosophy and an increase in antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., Byron Acohido,
Official Says Airlines' Growth Outpaced Demand, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at C8;
James Ott, U.S. Airlines Await Clinton Directions, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan.
25, 1993, at 34.
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B. REREGULATION
1. Recent Efforts - Airline Competition Enhancement Act of
1992 and the Clinton Proposals
On August 12, 1992, the House passed the Airline
Competition Enhancement Act of 1992.15 The purpose
of the bill is to increase competition in the airline indus-
try.' 5 4 The bill focuses on computer reservation systems
(CRSs) owned by the airlines. These systems, developed
over a number of years, provide advantages to their own-
ers by displaying their schedules first, charging higher
booking fees to competing airlines, and entering into con-
tracts with travel agents which make it difficult for the
travel agent to replace the CRS with that of a competi-
tor.'5 5 In summary, "[c]ritics charge that the inability of
travel agents to change easily to other systems continues
to give United and American significant advantages over
competitors."'156
The bill provides that by September 30, 1994, each
CRS would have to provide "functional equality."' 5 7
Practices which would be barred immediately include:
- Display bias in the listing of airline schedules or other
information;
- Actions that prohibit agents from obtaining or using
another CRS;
- Requirements that the term for existing services be
extended as a condition for providing additional CRS
services. 158
The bill would also provide that contracts between CRSs
and travel agents have terms not to exceed three years,
'15 House Passes Bill to Increase Competition in Airline Industry, 63 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 1579 (Aug. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Competition].
15 Id. But see Kleit, supra note 57, at 861 (arguing that "the two most important
antitrust charges, that of market power and display preference, appear theoreti-
cally incorrect and derived from important misunderstandings about how compe-
tition works in the CRS industry").
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and it would prohibit clauses that act to restrict the ability
of agents to terminate contracts or use other CRSs. 9
Consistent with the breadth of application that the title
of the bill suggests, it would also
- Prohibit airports from imposing passenger facility
charges on persons traveling on frequent flyer and other
free tickets;
- Limit the ability of carriers to discontinue service to
Essential Air Service (EAS) communities while they retain
their use of EAS slots at high-density airports; and
- Require the Federal Aviation Administration to initi-
ate a proceeding to determine whether to reduce from
50% the percentage of airline industry employees that
must be randomly tested for illegal drug use.
160
Despite success in the House, the bill never passed the
Senate. Even in the House, many were opposed to penal-
izing an airline for taking the risk to develop the CRS in
the first place.' 6'
The Clinton administration has evidenced a willingness
to address the current crisis in the airline industry. 16  In
May 1993, Transportation Secretary Frederico Pena con-
vened a National Airline Commission. In August, 1993,
the Commission issued its report which made over sixty
recommendations intended to relieve some of the difficul-
ties faced by the airline industry. Some of the recommen-
dations included:
- Exempting airlines from the 4.3 cent per gallon fuel
tax for two years;
- Revising bankruptcy laws to impose a one-year limit
159 Id.
60 Id. at 225-26.
161 Representative William Lipinski (D-Ill.), a House Public Works and Trans-
portation Committee member, has argued that the bill would "simply penalize the
airlines that excelled in the competitive environment." Id. at 225. Representative
James Inhofe (R-Okla.) also shares Lipinski's reservations arguing that the bill
only "punish[es] success." Id.
162 See, e.g., Acohido, supra note 152, at C8; Antitrust: Clinton, Congress May Spark
Legislation, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 14 Uan. 25, 1993); Ott, supra note 152,
at 34.
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for bankrupt carriers to file transportation plans under
Chapter 11;
- Cutting existing ticket and cargo taxes;
- Forming a special committee to assess carriers' finan-
cial health;
- Setting up an independent entity within the DOT to
manage all FAA air traffic control activities and to assure
stable funding;
- Reforming the alternative minimum tax;
- Increasing of the limit on foreign investment in U.S.
airlines to forty-nine percent;
- Requiring that airlines advise the DOT of plans to
protect workers when purchasing substantial assets or
routes of other airlines.' 63
In January 1994 Secretary Pena issued the Clinton ad-
ministration's proposal for overhauling the airline indus-
try.1 64 The proposal adopted forty-nine of the sixty-one
recommendations made by the National Airline Commis-
sion.1 5 Because of deficit concerns and the airline's re-
cent gains in profitability, none of the commission's tax
reduction proposals were adopted. 166 The Clinton plan
strongly advocates the creation of a quasi-private corpora-
tion that would take over air traffic control from the
FAA.' 67 However, because both the industry and the
economy are showing signs of gradual improvement, it is
unlikely that sweeping changes in regulation of the airline
industry will result within the next few years.
163 See Robin Sidel, Panel Recommends Airline Tax, Regulatory Relief, REUTER Bus.
REP., Aug. 19, 1993, at 1; Airline Commission's Final Report Urges Overhaul of Aviation
Policies, Daily Rep. for Executives, (BNA) A160 (Aug. 20, 1993); Airline Commission 's
Final Report Urges Overhaul of Aviation Policies, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 287 (Aug. 16, 1993).
,64 See Statement of the Secretary of Transportation, Daily Rep. for Executives, (BNA)
M5 (Jan. 7, 1994).
165 Plan to Aid Airlines is Announced; Clinton Proposals Aim at Reviving Industry, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 1994, at IA.
6 See Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz & Edward H. Phillips, Clinton Compromises on Airline
Strategy, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 10, 1994, at 22.
167 Id.
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2. Comprehensive Reregulation
Of those who favored deregulation, many have now
come to believe that a number of its premises were unwar-
ranted. 68 First, the expectation that the airline industry
would lack economies of scale which would insure a large
number of competitors has not materialized. 69 In an era
of competition for gates at the major hubs, the cost of en-
tering the industry is indeed high. Furthermore, threat of
entry - i.e. the contestability theory - has not proven to
be a deterrent to market concentration. The threat of en-
try due to low barriers to entry and an absence of sunk
entry costs has not kept prices low.' 70
- Regarding the notion that the air transportation industry posed no barriers
to entry, one commentator has noted that:
[E]ntry into the industry by new carriers seems more remote, and
entry onto new routes is far more difficult than many envisioned it
would be with deregulation. Many airline observers thought that the
1978 deregulation of pricing and entry would make airline markets
"contestable." That is, airlines could engage in "hit-and-run" entry
into each other's markets in response to profit opportunities - sim-
ply by shifting a plane from one route to another. Instead the evi-
dence compiled in the USAir-Piedmont record, as well as a large
body of solid research by economic and legal scholars in the past
three years, demonstrates that incumbent airlines are frequently
able to charge higher prices on routes where other carriers face bar-
riers to entry.
Guerin-Calvert, Hubs Can Hurt on Shorter Flights at Crowded Airports, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 7, 1987, at 28.
Alfred Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board and a propo-
nent of deregulation also admitted the failure of true contestability to hinder "de-
structive competition:"
Certainly one of the assumptions behind airline deregulation was
that entry would be relatively easy .... We believed that while entry
should be legally free and would be relatively easy, we never thought
that would provide adequate protection in markets that are naturally
monopolistic or oligopolistic - that just won't support more than
one or two carriers. But what happened was that the ideologues be-
gan simplistically to parrot the word "contestability" as though it
were a substitute for looking at the realities, even if the realities were
manifestly changing, even if survival of the new entrants was becom-
ing more and more questionable, as more and more of them were
going out of business, and even as it became clear that domination
of hubs was increasingly unchallengeable by new entrants.
Interview with Alfred E. Kahn, ANTITRUST, Fall 1988, at 7.
169 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 46.
170 Id.
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Despite the failure of deregulation to achieve its stated
purpose, few, if any, would advocate a return to an era of
heavy handed regulation.' 7' The Civil Aeronautics Board
of the early 1970s tended to restrict pricing flexibility and
prohibit route rationalization and new entry. 72 Today,
the focus of the debate seems to be on whether the anti-
trust laws (and perhaps stricter enforcement of those
laws) will be sufficient to stabilize the airline industry, or
whether limited economic regulation specific to the indus-
try is called for.' M
3. Limited Reregulation
At least one commentator has argued vigorously for
limited reregulation of the airline industry. 174 Traditional
antitrust remedies may not be desirable given the "signifi-
cant real economies of size, scope and density."' 75 Fur-
thermore, Dempsey argues that the transportation
industry has a quasi-public utility nature which suggests
the need for "enlightened regulation" in the public inter-
est. 176 Airline transportation facilitates commercial indus-
try, transports public officials, and provides opportunities
for individuals to travel beyond their own localities.
Dempsey identified seven areas to be included in any ex-
amination of reregulation: entry, pricing, antitrust, small
community access, safety, consumer protection, and regu-
latory reorganization. The rising deficit and improving
economy, however, will likely preclude any efforts at lim-
'71 See, e.g., id. at 47.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 48. Even industry leaders are beginning to predict the emergence of
the reregulation issue. Robert Crandall, chairman of American Airlines said:
"[W]ith the nation's air carriers losing money hand over wingflap, the issue [of
reregulation] is sure to arise in 1993.... The public clearly does not want to see
only two or three airlines remain." Crandall Foresees Debate on Re-regulating Airlines,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 17, 1992, at 14D; see also Industry Consultant Asks Clin-
ton to Establish Reasonable Controls, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993, at I (industry
analyst Mort Beyer proposed a review of U.S. aviation policy "in order to establish
an environment in which airline competition can again emerge").
175 DEMPSEY, supra note 2, at 48.
176 Id.
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ited reregulation in the near future. 17 7
C. PRIVATE ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
Private antitrust compliance programs mandated by
statute provide an alternative that would help implement
antitrust legislation. First, the cost to the public of an an-
titrust compliance program is extremely low. The pro-
gram would be implemented by the particular company
and thus paid for by that company. A second advantage
is that antitrust compliance programs are proactive in
their application. Ideally, they should prevent the anti-
trust activity. Litigation is a reactive tool which can only
address a problem after it has occurred. 78 Third, because
the antitrust compliance program is proactive, the trans-
action costs associated with litigation are minimized. 79
Another way to increase the effectiveness of such a stat-
ute would be to require trade associations or joint venture
companies to adopt such programs. This requirement
would ensure that those organizations which present a
particularly high risk for antitrust activity are keenly aware
of their legal obligations.18 0
An antitrust compliance program should encompass all
of the activities of an antitrust lawyer, including counsel-
ing on a day-to-day basis, holding seminars, and provid-
ing other more formal instructional activities.' 8 ' In the
narrow sense of the term, an antitrust compliance pro-
'77 See supra notes 153-167 and accompanying text.
178 See Industry Consultant Asks Clinton to Establish Reasonable Controls, supra note
174.
179 It would be unrealistic to argue that transaction costs are avoided com-
pletely, because it is impossible to say that litigation will never be pursued on an
antitrust claim no matter how vigilant a company may be in its compliance efforts.
See Robert C. Weinbaum, Establishing and Running a Compliance Program, 57 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 195, 199 (1988).
I80 Note that ATPC was originally part of a trade group that is now owned by
approximately forty airlines. Patrick J. Maio, Major Airlines Settle Price-Fixing Law-
suit, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Mar. 18, 1994, at 1. An Antitrust compliance pro-
gram which would apply broadly to these forty market participants would seem to
be more effective than, or at least as desirable supplement to airline-specific com-
pliance programs.
18' See A.B.A., COMPLIANCE MANUALS FOR THE NEW ANTITRUST ERA (1990).
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gram is limited to its formalized programs. 82
Robert C. Weinbaum set forth four requirements for a
successful antitrust compliance program.' 83  First, he
urged that there must be management commitment at all
levels of the company to insure compliance with the law,
both in letter and spirit.' 84 This is achieved by pointing
out both the necessity of compliance, and the penalties
for noncompliance. 85 Putting this in business terms, the
lawyer needs to emphasize what effect compliance and,
more importantly, noncompliance will have on the effi-
cient running of the organization.' 8 6
The second element of a successful antitrust compli-
ance program is making certain the client knows what the
purpose of the law is.' 87 This element allows the client to
transact business with a legal frame of reference.'8 8 The
third element is to make the antitrust lawyer part of the
business team. This requires that the lawyer develop a
good relationship with his or her client. This relationship
facilitates easy communication regarding antitrust devel-
opments; the better the relationship, the more amenable
the client will be to making time to listen and to digest
antitrust information. ' 89
Finally, compliance activities should be conducted at
regular intervals.' 90 Weinbaum recognized that this
would vary by industry and by requirements, but empha-
sized the importance of repetition in making sure the cli-
82 Weinbaum, supra note 179, at 195; see also Howard Adler, Jr. & Joseph P.
Fisher, Corporate Counseling in the New Antitrust Environment, 6 No. 3 AM. CORP.
COUNS. Ass'N DOCKET 8 (1988); William B. Lawrence, Protecting Against Problems -
Corporate Compliance Programs, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 601 (1988).
183 Weinbaum, supra note 179. Weinbaum's construct is used here only for illus-
tration. There is a large volume of literature on antitrust compliance, and the
elements mentioned in Weinbaum's program are common to all programs.
-. Weinbaum, supra note 181, at 196.
185 Id.
186 Id. Weinbaum aptly pointed out that the client would be particularly careful




I-o Id. at 196-97.
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ent is aware of and complies with the antitrust laws.'' In
addition, it is necessary to involve both senior and junior
attorneys in conveying that message. Weinbaum empha-
sized importance of this due to the complex nature of an-
titrust laws. ' 92
Once an effective compliance program is in place, it is
necessary to determine the medium by which to commu-
nicate the compliance message. This can include written
materials, seminars, videos, and newsletters. Consistent
with the fourth goal - frequent repetition of the message
- Weinbaum encourages republication of the more im-
portant materials. 93 Also important is customizing the
materials to the particular audience. 94 What is required
may vary according to which department is to receive the
materials - marketing, financial, purchasing, engineer-
ing, or research. 95
Finally, one of the most important tools is the antitrust
audit.' 96 An antitrust audit is essential for an effective
compliance program; however, it must be carefully per-
formed in order to prevent exposing the corporation to
additional risks. 97 Antitrust audits also provide an op-
portunity for counsel and management to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the compliance program.198
191 Id.




- Id. at 198.
197 Joseph E. Murphy, Surviving the Antitrust Compliance Audit, 59 ANTITRUST L.J.
953, 953 (1991). Murphy urges that the audit should be carefully conducted to
ensure that information will fall under the attorney-client, work product, or self-
evaluative privilege, and to avoid a situation whereby efforts to comply with the
law turn into a tool by which violations of the law are exposed. Id. It is clear from
the case law, however, that no written audit report can be safe from adverse use.
Id. Murphy's article also details eighteen tips for surviving a compliance audit. Id.
at 960. See also Howard Adler, Jr. & Sharon J. Devine, How to Avoid Antitrust Death
by Document, 10 AM. CORP. CouNs. Ass'N DOCKET 30 (1992).
198 Murphy, supra note 197.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Today's airline industry is plagued with uncertainty, de-
structive competition, and increased concentration of
market power. Efforts by private citizens to respond to
this chaos through antitrust litigation is by no means the
most effective means to address the problem. As evi-
denced by In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litiga-
tion, the settlements which are reached often provide,
upon close examination, limited remedies and doubtful
monitoring of the future competitive behavior of the few
airlines left in the industry. Proposals to reregulate on a
somewhat lesser scale than that which was in place prior
to deregulation are theoretically appealing. In a business
environment that is naturally hostile to governmental in-
terference and with a spending crisis accompanied by an
ever increasing national debt, however, it is unlikely that
even light-handed regulation will be attempted. To put it
simply, it would cost too much.
On the other hand, a statute mandating the implemen-
tation of private in-house antitrust compliance programs
including minimum standards would be more feasible.
For one, the cost of these programs would be borne by
the companies themselves rather than the taxpayer. Two,
most companies more than likely already have some sort
of compliance program in place.' 99 This type of answer
caters to those who would like to see the airline industry
held accountable, as well as to proponents of free market
competition. In addition, such programs reduce the
amount of government resources required for regulation.
Another advantage to requiring antitrust compliance pro-
grams is that such programs provide a proactive approach
to the problem, rather than reactive approach. Litigation
is reactive, and as has been demonstrated through the il-
lustration of In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litiga-
9 A company is likely to have a compliance program if it was involved in the In
re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation, which required each of the
settling defendants to "establish and/or maintain" an antitrust compliance
program.
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tion, litigation is sometimes a "too little, too late"
measure.

